Journeys with Autism

The very idea that autism appears in any book called the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is deeply offensive to me. When I venture in and try to make sense of the current split between the diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s and autism, all I can see is that it places autistic people into hierarchies that make no logical or practical sense.

Because this whole subject is really bothering me, I thought it might be fun to rewrite the diagnostic criteria, line by line, so that the text describes us as something more than walking collections of mysterious pathologies. In my rewrite, I have maintained each line of the diagnostic criteria with a strikethrough, followed by my proposed changes. Because the people who wrote the diagnostic criteria reused some of the same text, but didn’t bother to create a consistent numbering scheme, I couldn’t combine the criteria for Asperger’s and autism without adding more illogic to the situation. In a perfect world, people would check their writing for logical consistency before they publish it. Since they didn’t, my rewrite consists of two parts.

Part One
How to Tell Whether Someone is an Asperger’s Awe-tistic
Diagnostic Criteria for 299.80 Asperger’s Disorder

(I) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:
(I) An unusual mode of social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:

(A) marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction
(A) An acute sensory and empathic sensitivity that i) makes eye contact and social interaction intensely difficult and ii) results in the rejection of ambiguous nonverbal behaviors in favor of direct, detailed, and honest speech.

(B) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
(B) Beginning in early childhood, a gift for developing relationships with people of widely different ages and developmental trajectories.

(C) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interest or achievements with other people, (e.g.. by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other people)
(C) The understanding, gained uncannily early in life, that i) most people will not appreciate the awe-tist’s interests or achievements, and ii) showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest will be met with judgment and/or hostility that manifest in socially acceptable forms of repression (such as social exclusion) or criminal acts (such as physical assault).

(D) lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(D) An acute sensitivity to the feelings of others that causes the awe-tist to refrain from using banal pleasantries or empty words that may hurt or offend.

(E) An altogether eccentric form of social and emotional reciprocity that insists upon fairness, directness, sensitivity, tolerance, substance, acceptance of difference, and mutually interesting subject matter.

(II) Restricted repetitive & stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:
(II) Specialized, disciplined, and brilliantly useful patterns of behavior, interests, and activities, as manifested by at least one of the following:

(A) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
(A) A passion for one or more specialized subjects extraordinary in intensity and focus.

(B) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals
(B) An innate capacity for self-care that manifests itself in the creation of comforting routines and a fascination with patterns of all kinds.

(C) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g. hand or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
(C) An innate capacity for sensory self-regulation by means of various stims, which can encompass such soothing activities as joint compression, touching the comforting texture of soft fabrics, watching spinning objects, and so forth.

(D) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
(D) An exceptional ability to work with objects in an unconventional fashion.

(III) The disturbance causes clinically significant impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
(III) Because the world is not yet attuned to the acute sensitivities and extraordinary gifts of awe-tistic people, being awe-tistic can result in social ostracism, occupational dead-ends, and other disappointing outcomes. For the lives of awe-tistic people to improve, early educational and social intervention in the lives of neuro-typical people is recommended.

(IV) There is no clinically significant general delay in language (E.G. single words used by age 2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years)
(IV) Whether you started talking at two years old or four years old, does it really matter?

(V) There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development or in the development of age-appropriate self help skills, adaptive behavior (other than in social interaction) and curiosity about the environment in childhood.
(V) We are certain that in a different time and culture, awe-tistic people would have places of honor as shamans, dreamers, healers, artists, builders, and trusted confidantes.

(VI) Criteria are not met for another specific Pervasive Developmental Disorder or Schizophrenia.
(VI) The person’s awe-tistic consciousness is not better accounted for by some other type of hierarchical hair-splitting that results in diagnosing life itself as a kind of disease.

Part Two
How to Tell Whether Someone is Awe-tistic, Period
Diagnostic Criteria for 299.00 Autistic Disorder

(I) A total of six (or more) items from (A), (B), and (C), with at least two from (A), and one each from (B) and (C):

(A) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:
(A) An unusual mode of social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the following:

(1) marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture, and gestures to regulate social interaction
(1) A lack of reliance on the use of ambiguous nonverbal behaviors.

(2) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level
(2) A love of solitude and solitary play.

(3) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interest or achievements with other people, (e.g.. by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest to other people)
(3) The understanding, gained uncannily early in life, that i) most people will not appreciate the awe-tist’s interests or achievements, and that ii) showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest will be met with judgment and/or hostility that can manifest in socially accepted forms of repression (such as social exclusion) or criminal acts (such as physical assault).

(4) lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(4) An acute sensitivity to the feelings of others that causes the awe-tist to refrain from using banal pleasantries or empty words that may hurt or offend.

(5) An altogether eccentric form of social and emotional reciprocity that insists upon fairness, directness, sensitivity, tolerance, substance, acceptance of difference, and mutually interesting subject matter.

(B) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the following:
(B) qualitative differences in thought and perception as manifested by at least one of the following:

1. delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not accompanied by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of communication such as gesture or mime)
1. Visual and associative thought patterns that the awe-tist has difficulty translating into the more restrictive medium of verbal language.

2. in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others
2. An acute sensory and empathic sensitivity that makes spending extensive periods of time with people intensely difficult.

3. stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language
3. An effort to use language despite the tremendous challenge of transitioning between visual/associative thinking and verbal/linear expression.

4. lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play appropriate to developmental level
4. The development of all kinds of unique, idiosyncratic, and interesting ways to spend one’s time.

(C) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, as manifested by at least two of the following:
(C) Specialized, disciplined, and brilliantly useful patterns of behavior, interests, and activities, as manifested by at least two of the following:

(1) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus
(1) A passion for one or more specialized subjects extraordinary in intensity and focus.

(2) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals
(2) An innate capacity for self-care that manifests itself in the creation of comforting routines and a fascination with patterns of all kinds.

(3) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g. hand or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements)
(3) An innate capacity for sensory self-regulation by means of various stims, which can encompass such soothing activities as joint compression, touching the comforting texture of soft fabrics, watching spinning objects, and other similarly enjoyable activities.

(4) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
(4) An exceptional ability to work with objects in an unconventional fashion.

(II) Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior to age 3 years:

(A) social interaction
(B) language as used in social communication
(C) symbolic or imaginative play

(II) Because awe-tistic people often see the world in unusual ways, the difficulty of translating awe-tistic consciousness into the more restrictive medium of verbal language may result in the pathologizing of awe-tistic social interaction, language development, and play.

(III) The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or Childhood Disintegrative Disorder
(III) The person’s awe-tistic consciousness is not better accounted for by some other type of hierarchical hair-splitting that results in life itself becoming a kind of disease. 

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg

In his 2009 paper Autism: The Empathizing–Systemizing (E-S) Theory, Professor Baron-Cohen expands upon his Extreme-Male-Brain theory of autism. Unfortunately, he does not come any closer to understanding autism than when he started.

A Series of Incorrect Assumptions

Baron-Cohen begins the paper by asserting that the mind-blindness theory of autism neatly explains all the social difficulties encountered by autistic people. From this assertion flows a litany of incorrect conclusions:

1. Baron-Cohen asserts that autistic people have an impaired Theory of Mind (ToM), which he defines as “the ability to put oneself into someone else’s shoes, to imagine their thoughts and feelings.” (Baron-Cohen, 68-69)

All I can say is: Give me a slight break. The everyday experience of many autistic people, all across the spectrum, contradicts the professor’s theory. Many of us experience such a high degree of empathy that we are constantly putting ourselves in other people’s shoes and trying to see all sides in any controversy or conflict. Many of our problems with sensory and emotional overload derive from an excess of this ability, not a deficit.

2. Because we lack a proper ToM, we have trouble knowing when we are hurting someone’s feelings.

From my contact with autistic people, it’s clear to me that our empathy leads many of us to constantly question the impact of our words. While I am far from perfect, choosing my words carefully may very well rank as one of my Aspie obsessions. However, the professor believes that “the typical 9-year-old can figure out what might hurt another’s feelings and what might therefore be better left unspoken. Children with Asperger syndrome are delayed by around 3 years in this skill.” (Baron-Cohen, 69)

Choosing my words carefully, so as not to give offense, I wish to say to the professor: “Simon, my friend. (May I call you Simon? I’m not sure, since I can’t read your mind.) You say that autistic people can’t properly put themselves into the shoes of another person. Let me respond as gently as I can: Those words were much, much better left unspoken. They hurt me. And when other people believe what you’re saying, your words cause autistic people no end of trouble. So, the next time you feel tempted to say such things, turn off your computer and have a good meal. You’ll feel better.”

3. Baron-Cohen dismisses studies that fail to find any ToM deficits in autistic people:

“[S]ome studies have failed to find any evidence of a ToM deficit in ASC [autism spectrum conditions], though this may be because among high-functioning, older individuals the tasks need to be sufficiently subtle and age-appropriate to avoid ‘floor effects.’” (Baron-Cohen, 70)

The results “may” be thrown off because of the presence of “high-functioning,” older adults? Didn’t Baron-Cohen attempt to find out who actually participated in these studies? Isn’t that part of writing a research paper? In any case, we “high-functioning” types do not skew test results by excelling at easy tasks. We help the professionals arrive at the proper results by articulating what’s going on.

4. After spending a fair amount of time defending his mind-blindness theory, the professor adds a new and even more incorrect component to it. He “broadens” of the concept of ToM to include an empathetic response:

“Most people regard ToM as just the cognitive component of empathy in that it simply involves identifying someone else’s (or your own) mental states…However, missing from ToM is the second component of empathy, the response element: having an appropriate emotional reaction to another person’s thoughts and feelings. This is referred to affective empathy.” (Baron-Cohen, 71)

Baron-Cohen goes on to say that, in addition to not empathizing well, we don’t know how to respond to someone even after the person tells us what‘s wrong.

News flash: Once someone tells me how he or she feels, I don’t usually have a problem with an empathetic response. Sometimes, I’ll make sure that my response is welcome, out of respect for the other person’s boundaries. For instance, if a person is crying, I might ask whether the person would like a hug, or whether the person would like to talk. Some people want hugs, and some people want to be left alone. I consider it courteous to ask. Once I know people fairly well, however, and I know what works for them, I simply respond. Just ask my husband, my daughter, my daughter’s friends, my friends, my former co-workers, my neighbors, and all the animals I’ve ever helped care for in various stages of illness.

Well, I guess you can’t ask the animals, but you get the idea.

Extending the Extreme-Male-Brain Theory

Despite our supposed deficits in the areas that make people truly human, there’s good news in store. Building on his Extreme-Male-Brain theory, Baron-Cohen posits that while we have difficulty Empathizing (E), we’re not too bad at Systemizing (S). If you remember, we have Extremely Male Brains, so the fact that we’re good at systemizing should not come as a surprise. I mean, I’m sure that those of you with systemizing brains already had that one all figured out, didn’t you?

Here’s the good news in the professor’s own words:

“According to the empathizing–systemizing (E-S) theory, autism and Asperger syndrome are best explained not just with reference to empathy (below average) but also with reference to a second psychological factor (systemizing), which is either average or even above average.” (Baron-Cohen, 71)

Hurrah for us! We’re average. And sometimes, we’re above average. It’s a dream come true.

And in case there is any doubt as to those tasks that we’re so, um, average at doing, here is the professor’s definition of systemizing:

“Systemizing is the drive to analyze or construct systems. These might be any kind of system. What defines a system is that it follows rules, and when we systemize we are trying to identify the rules that govern the system, in order to predict how that system will behave (Baron-Cohen 2006). These are some of the major kinds of systems: collectible systems (e.g., distinguishing between types of stones), mechanical systems (e.g., a video-recorder), numerical systems (e.g., a train timetable), abstract systems (e.g., the syntax of a language), natural systems (e.g., tidal wave patterns), social systems (e.g., a management hierarchy), and motoric systems (e.g., bouncing on a trampoline). In all these cases, you systemize by noting regularities (or structure) and rules.” (Baron-Cohen, 71)

I had no idea that jumping on a trampoline made me a systemizer or that it was evidence of autism. I am so excited! I used to jump on a trampoline ALL THE TIME when I was a kid.

But there’s a catch. In the next sentence, Baron-Cohen makes a statement that suggests that none of us are autistic to begin with: “So it is the discrepancy between E and S that determines if you are likely to develop an autism spectrum condition.” (Baron-Cohen, 71)

Likely to develop an autism spectrum condition? WHAT? You mean, I wasn’t born with it? Wow. If only they’d given me empathy lessons in grammar school, rather than letting me bounce on that stupid trampoline, I’d be normal today.

I wonder whether it’s too late to sue the school district.

Misunderstanding the Purpose of Stimming

Not surprisingly, the train goes further and further off the track as the article continues. Here is Baron-Cohen’s list of systemizing behaviors in classic autism and Asperger’s Syndrome. The Asperger’s behaviors are in italics. (Baron-Cohen, 74)

Now, it seems to me that if a neuro-typical person were doing these kinds of activities, another neuro-typical person might (perhaps correctly) assume that the person was systemizing because his or her brain was structured that way.

However, it’s always ill advised to draw neuro-typical conclusions by watching the behavior of autistic people, because autistic people experience the world in a completely different way. Therefore, we might have reasons for our “systemizing” behavior that have nothing to do with having innately “systemizing” brains.

For example, most autistic people would recognize many of the activities in Baron-Cohen’s list as stims: tapping fingers, letting the sand slide through your fingers, rocking, watching something go round and round, putting things in a certain order, watching the same video over and over, playing a tune on an instrument over and over, and so forth. Baron-Cohen does mention the subject of stims, but he spectacularly misinterprets their purpose:

“[W]hen the low-functioning person with classic autism shakes a piece of string thousands of times close to his eyes…the E-S theory sees the..behavior as a sign that the individual ‘understands’ the physics of that string movement.” (Baron-Cohen, 74)

The E-S theory may see the behavior in that way, but I’m not convinced that many autistic people do. The professor needs to watch Amanda Baggs’ In My Language video for a crash course on how many unusual reasons we can have for all the interesting things we do.

About that string, Baron-Cohen continues:

“He may for example make it move in exactly the same way every time. Or when he makes a long, rapid sequence of sounds, he may know exactly that acoustic pattern and get some pleasure from the confirmation that the sequence is the same every time. Much as a mathematician might feel an ultimate sense of pleasure that the “golden ratio” ((a + b)/a = a/b) always comes out as 1.61803399. . ., so the child…who produces the same outcome every time with his repetitive behavior, appears to derive some emotional pleasure at the predictability of the world. This may be what is clinically described as ’stimming’ (Wing 1997).” (Baron-Cohen, 74-75)

To Baron-Cohen, the child “appears” to derive some emotional pleasure at the predictability of the world. The only person who could draw this conclusion would be someone who experiences the world as a predictable place. I can’t vouch for any other autistic person, but I do not experience the world in that way. Far from it. The world feels chaotic to me.

When I stim, I’m not taking pleasure in the predictability of the world. I’m taking refuge from the chaos of the world. I’m soothing my very sensitive nervous system by a) moving my body in comforting ways, such as when I rock or toe-walk or b) creating some sort of tangible order, such as when I arrange books by subject or organize beads by color, shape, size, and texture. To soothe myself, I’m creating what I can’t ordinarily perceive. I’m saying, in the words of Mrs. Ramsay in Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, “Life stand still here.”

But This Theory is So Good for Us

In singing the praises of his E-S theory, Baron-Cohen doesn’t hesitate to announce how much it will help autistic folk and our loved ones. For example, he speculates that the theory will lead to interventions that will help us cope in the world:

“[This] theory is giving rise to novel interventions, in particular using the strong systemizing to teach empathy, for example, presenting emotions in an autism-friendly format (Baron-Cohen 2007b; Golan et al. 2006).” (Baron-Cohen, 70)

When I saw the phrase “presenting emotions in an autism-friendly format,” I was hoping that Baron-Cohen meant “quietly, slowly, and respectfully.” (Hey, a girl can dream, can’t she?) Unfortunately, that’s not what he meant:

“The DVD Mind Reading…presents actors posing facial expressions such that people with autism can teach themselves emotion recognition via a computer. This involves taking the quite artificial approach of presenting mental states (such as emotional expressions) as if they are lawful and systemizable, even if they are not (Golan et al. 2006).” (Baron-Cohen, 70)

I see. So we’re going to use computers to understand emotion in a systematic way, even though emotions do not follow any natural laws. Well, since our Extremely Male Brains make us pretty much like computers anyway, why not? And given that we don’t understand deception, we’ll believe anyone who tells us that we can learn about emotions using a computer program, won’t we? It’s perfect.

But it gets better, at least at first glance:

“E-S theory destigmatizes autism and AS, relating these to individual differences we see in the population (between and within the sexes), rather than as categorically distinct or mysterious. For many decades, the diagnosis of autism was one that many parents dreaded, as it suggested their child was biologically set apart from the rest of humanity in lacking the basic machinery for social engagement and in suggesting autism is a disease of the brain. The E-S theory focuses not just on the areas of difficulty (empathy) but also on the areas of strength (systemizing) in ASC, and views ASC as a difference in cognitive style that is part of a continuum of such differences found in everyone, rather than as a disease.” (Baron-Cohen, 73)

Destigmatizing is good. But is that really what Baron-Cohen is doing here? I don’t think so.

1) He attempts to destigmatize autism by putting us into categories that the general population can understand. As opposed to being “categorically distinct,” we are now different in the same, familiar way that men and women are different. Men systemize, and women empathize. We’re just really manly men—and, er, women. Don’t you feel better now?

2) He completely misses the point that autism and AS are categorically distinct from other neurological kinds of wiring.

We are not just interesting variations from the norm, but people with a fundamentally different way of seeing and experiencing the world. We’re non-normative human beings. Being distinct is not the same as being dangerous or inhuman. To take away our distinctness in order to destigmatize autism only plays into the fears of the general population. It doesn’t allay those fears at all.

3) While at first glance, I was happy to see that he rejects the world “disease,” I find myself dismayed that Baron-Cohen does not replace it with anything that sounds any better.

After all, autism may not be “a disease of the brain,” but much of his work is an attempt to suggest that we are, in fact, “biologically set apart from the rest of humanity in lacking the basic machinery for social engagement.” Isn’t that the point of saying that we are innately poor at empathy and the social skills that depend upon it? Playing up our “systemizing” skills while telling people that we do not care about them is hardly a giant leap forward.

4) While Baron-Cohen appears to celebrate our “systemizing” strengths as a way to bring us into the light of human dignity, he forgets that some of us flunked calculus, can’t disassemble or reassemble gadgets, and don’t care in the least about the Latin names of anything. Autistic women, in particular, do not present with the same kinds of traits as the majority of autistic men.

What is to be done with autistic people who have “difficulties” with both the feminine ability to empathize and the masculine ability to systemize? Should we make them use computers or line things up in rows until they learn to systemize properly? After all, it’s pretty clear that the empathy thing is not even worth trying.

I have a better idea. Let’s tear up Baron-Cohen’s theory and start all over again. After all, as he says toward the end of his paper:

“One criticism of the E-S theory is that the evidence base for it is still quite limited.” (Baron-Cohen, 73)

Ya think?

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg

In his 1999 paper The extreme-male-brain theory of autism, Professor Simon Baron-Cohen posits a dichotomy between the empathizing female brain and the systematizing male brain. In Baron-Cohen’s theory, autistic people have extreme versions of the systematizing male brain.

Baron-Cohen begins his paper with an introduction characteristic of many articles about autism and autistic people:

“Autism is widely regarded to be the most severe of the childhood psychiatric conditions (Rutter, 1983; Frith, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 1995). It is diagnosed on the basis of abnormal social development, abnormal communicative development, and the presence of narrow, restricted interests, and repetitive activity, along with limited imaginative ability (DSMIV, 1994). Such children fail to become social, instead remaining on the periphery of any social group, and becoming absorbed in repetitive interests and activities, such as collecting unusual objects or facts. It is a tragedy for their families who work tirelessly to attempt to engage with and socialize their child, mostly with very limited results.” (Baron-Cohen, 3)

Let’s consider the professor’s assumptions and omissions:

1) Baron-Cohen characterizes autism as “the most severe of the childhood psychiatric conditions.” However, autism is not a psychiatric condition, nor is it limited to children. It is a neurological condition with which we are born, and with which we live throughout our lives.

2) The professor describes autism mainly by pointing to external markers: social development, communicative development, and the presence of restricted interests and repetitive activity. The only mention of our internal processes is the remark that we have “limited imaginative ability,” which is not even the case in all instances. Take a look at the work of autistic artists all over the world and you will see a level of imagination that eludes most people, including professors at major universities.

However, the author’s omissions are even more telling than his words. Nowhere does he mention our sensory sensitivities, our unusual communicative or cognitive abilities, our capacity for rational thought, our empathy, our gifts, the love we feel for others, or any other process that goes on in the human mind and heart. To see autistic people only by external markers shows a significant lack of empathy in every sense of the word.

3) Autism is “a tragedy for…families who work tirelessly to attempt to engage with and socialize their child, mostly with very limited results.” Our very existence, apparently, is a tragedy. Autistic people, of course, have no feelings, no struggles, and no tragedies of our own. We just cause other people pain and suffering.

Once he gets done slandering us, Simon-Cohen adduces a number of questionable arguments for his extreme-male-brain theory—arguments with which he seeks to prove that autistic people have odd versions of male brains:

“(i) Normal males are superior in spatial tasks compared to normal females, and people with autism or Asperger Syndrome are even better on spatial tasks, such as the Embedded Figures Test (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, in press).” (Baron-Cohen, 33)

Any difference in abilities between males and females can easily be explained not by brain structure, but by the ways in which girls are socialized and educated in western societies. The conclusion that neuro-typical males are innately superior to neuro-typical females in spatial tasks ignores the effects of culture, context, and socially imposed gender roles.

Moreover, many autistic people have very poor spatial abilities. I am autistic, but my spatial abilities are quite limited. I failed Calculus because I couldn’t rotate three-dimensional objects in my mind. I still can’t. My mind works only in two dimensions. I can see height and width, but not depth.

“(ii) There is a strong male bias in the sex ratio of autism or AS.” (Baron-Cohen, 33)

As Tony Attwood and others have shown, female Aspies tend to have an entirely different presentation from males. The diagnostic criteria were developed from the results of studies using only males. All of Leo Kanner’s subjects and Hans Asperger’s subjects were boys. The male bias lies in the diagnostic markers, not in the condition of autism itself.

“(iii) Normal males are slower to develop language than normal females, and children with autism are even more delayed in language development (Rutter, 1978).” (Baron-Cohen, 33)

People with Asperger’s, by definition, do not have language delays. Given that Asperger’s Syndrome is autism by a different name, and that more than half of all autistic people have Asperger’s, it’s impossible to make the claim that the language development of all autistic people is delayed.

“(iv) Normal males are slower to develop socially than normal females, and people with autism are even more delayed in social development (O’Riordan, Baron-Cohen, Jones, Stone, and Plaisted, 1996).”

Baron-Cohen fails to question the reason for the lag in normative male social development. Is it nature or nurture? Since girls are socialized to cooperate, and boys are socialized to fight, it’s clear that nurture plays a large role in helping girls develop better social skills than their male counterparts.

“(v) Normal females are superior to males on mindreading tasks, and people with autism or AS are severely impaired in mindreading (see Baron-Cohen et al, 1996).”

It’s true that most people with autism cannot figure out the mental states of other people from nonverbal cues. It’s also true that Baron-Cohen, despite his obsession with the external behaviors of autistic people, is unable to figure out our mental states at all. Does that make him autistic? After all, he’s a man and he can’t read our minds.

I rest my case.

“(vi) Parents of children with autism or AS (who can be assumed to share the genotype of their child) also show superior spatial abilities and relative deficits in mindreading (i.e., a marked male brain pattern (Baron-Cohen and Hammer, in press b).”

If the female, non-autistic parent has superior spatial skills, doesn’t that disprove that such skills are inherently male?

“(vii) Normal males have a smaller corpus callosum than normal females, and people with autism or AS have an even smaller one (Egaas, Courchesne, and Saitou, 1994).”

A 1997 study by Professors Bishop and Wahlsten at the University of Alberta showed that, on average, the corpus callosum is larger in males, not smaller. According to the article, “Data collected before 1910 from cadavers indicate that, on average, males have larger brains than females and that the average size of their corpus callosum is larger…The recent studies, most of which used magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), confirm the earlier findings of larger average brain size and overall corpus callosum size for males. The widespread belief that women have a larger splenium than men and consequently think differently is untenable.”

“(viii) Left handedness is more common among males, and people with autism or AS show an elevated incidence of left-handedness. Fein, Humes, Kaplan, Lucci, and Waterhouse (1984) found an 18% incidence of left-handedness in autism. Satz and colleagues (Satz, Soper, Orsini, Henry, and Zvi, 1985; Soper, Orsini, Henry, Zvi, and Schulman, 1986) found a very similar picture: in their autistic sample, 22% were left handed.”

I didn’t find any of the previous criteria compelling in the least, but now that we’re talking about left-handedness, I really have to give the professor his due.

Yes, my friends, I am left-handed and autistic.

Of course, my mother, who was also left handed, was not autistic. My father, who was not left-handed, was almost definitely autistic. And my mother’s parents, both of whom were left-handed, were neuro-typical. But why throw in such annoying details when the proof is sitting right in my left hand?

“(ix) In the normal population, the male brain is heavier than the female brain, and people with autism have even heavier brains than normal males (Bailey et al, 1994).”

Apparently, to Professor Baron-Cohen, size matters.

“(x) In the normal population, more males are found in mathematical/mechanical/spatial occupations than females. Parents of children with autism or AS are disproportionately represented in such occupations (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Bolton, Stott & Goodyer 1996). These occupations all require good folk physics whilst not necessarily requiring equally developed folk psychological skills.”

Like his first conclusion, his final one ignores the effects of culture and context. Girls are socialized and educated to follow paths that do not involve mathematical, mechanical, or spatial skills. No proof exists that females, by nature, find it difficult to acquire these skills. None.

In addition to the faulty evidence that Baron-Cohen adduces, there are three general problems with his theory:

1) He employs a dichotomy between the empathizing female brain and the systematizing male brain. Apparently, he has never considered the idea that systematizing and empathizing could exist in extreme measure in the same brain. His theory leaves out those of us who both systematize and empathize in non-normative ways.

For example, like many autistic people, I systematize constantly, and I also have extreme amounts of empathy. Where do I fit in his paradigm? Nowhere.

2) The theory assumes that our autistic brains are an odd version of non-autistic brains. Baron-Cohen doesn’t consider the obvious fact that autistic brain development and cognitive abilities are substantially different from those of neuro-typical people. He takes a brain structure that he considers “normal” (i.e. his own), and then he decides that any other type of brain must simply be a variation of the norm.

3) Baron-Cohen utterly ignores the fact that men are socialized to be analytical, practical, and unemotional, while women are socialized to be intuitive, emotional, and sensitive. Because Baron-Cohen, like many of his peers in the academic and scientific communities, remains oblivious to the cultural context in which he operates, many autistic women still go undiagnosed. We’re just not “male” enough to show up on his radar. 

Like the insult that autistic people lack empathy, a theory that leaves autistic women undiagnosed is not simply wrong. It has serious consequences for our well-being.

In my opinion, most autism “experts” fail to understand autism. The academics and scientists who study us, observe us, test us, and wring their hands over us are neuro-typical. Therefore, they cannot intuitively understand our internal processes and experiences. The best of them listen and learn. The worst of them publish incorrect—and damaging—conclusions.

For my own part, I’ve gotten the best information from other autistic people. We are the true experts on autism. Just as even the most sensitive man cannot be an expert on what it’s like to be a woman, so even the most sensitive neuro-typical person cannot be an expert on what it’s like to be autistic. It’s simple neurology. It can’t be done.

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg

I really enjoyed reading all the responses to my post about the Sally-Anne test. Your comments helped me see a variety of reasons that a child might give one answer or another—reasons that have nothing to do with Theory of Mind (ToM) ability.

I began thinking more about the subject when I came upon an interesting post about joint attention on Quirky Mom’s blog. Her post reinforces my sense that the Sally-Anne test is measuring sensory processing differences, at least in some cases.

To quote Quirky Mom:

“Joint attention is what happens when two people look at something together, each aware of their shared attention on some object. This is a critical social skill that has its foundations in infancy, and it is a skill that is commonly impaired in children and adults with autism spectrum disorders. The ability to follow an adult’s gaze often emerges as early as 6 months in a typically developing child.”

Quirky Mom has been looking at her daughter Apple’s issues with joint attention. When Quirky Mom gazes in the direction of a particular object, and asks Apple the location of that object, Apple does not take any cues from her mother’s gaze. Instead, she looks all around the room for the object. When Quirky Mom describes the object and its location, Apple has no trouble taking the verbal cue and finding the object.

I had never thought about this subject before. I don’t think that I follow another person’s gaze very well at all. I’m too busy orienting myself in space and keeping track of what’s around me. If someone actually points at an object they want me to see, I have no trouble following that cue. It’s as though the person’s pointing finger creates a path through the maze of visual input that lies between me and the object. I can then navigate that path without any trouble

The key question in the Sally-Anne test is “Where will Sally look for the marble?” If you ask that question of a child who does not follow another person’s gaze, and who is used to looking all around to find something, it’s perfectly reasonable for that child to assume that Sally would do the same. When the child says that Sally will think the marble is in the box, it’s a reflection of how that child seeks out objects. It has nothing to do with whether the child understands that people do not always share the same bank of knowledge.

Thanks for posting about this subject, Quirky Mom. I’ll look forward to hearing more.

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg

The basic Theory of Mind (ToM) test was first developed by Wimmer and Perner in 1983, and then modified by Leslie and Frith in 1988. Wimmer and Perner used dolls, while Leslie and Frith used human actors. Regardless of the version, researchers have always come to the same conclusion regarding the results of the test.

I’ve always had my doubts about this conclusion.

The most common form of the ToM test is called the Sally-Anne Test. The ostensible purpose of the test is to measure a person’s ability to attribute false beliefs to other people. In the original version, the clinician uses two dolls, Sally and Anne. Sally has a basket, and Anne has a box. Sally puts a marble in her basket and leaves the scene of the action. Anne takes the marble out of Sally’s basket and puts it in her box. When Sally returns, the clinician asks the child where Sally will look for the marble.

To pass the test, a child must say that Sally will mistakenly look in her own basket first, evincing the belief that Sally is unaware that the marble has been moved. A child who fails the test will say that Sally will look in Anne’s box, where the marble is actually located. In Simon Baron-Cohen’s 1985 study of ToM in autism, 80% of the autistic children failed this test. The conclusion drawn is that the autistic children have an impaired (or non-existent) ToM and cannot understand that other people have information and beliefs different from their own.

I am very bothered by this conclusion. Very, very bothered.

I know that most neuro-typical researchers believe they have a “normal” ToM and can understand autistic people rather well. Needless to say, I’m quite skeptical. It’s not rocket science to know that you can read people who are like you, but have a harder time reading people who are unlike you. I would much rather hear an autistic person describe his or her own experience than hear a neuro-typical researcher making statements about how autistic people view the world.

Moreover, I am very suspicious about someone drawing a single conclusion from a psychological test. People are so complex that one child’s answer may be due to a large variety of factors, some of which may not ever have entered the mind of the researcher.

I had an insight into alternative reasons for a “failed” Sally-Anne test when I was at my OT visit this week. During one of the exercises, the OT and I were talking about why I always move my head when I move my eyes, and why I always have to turn my whole body to look at something.  Until I started seeing my OT, it had never crossed my mind that I might look at something without moving my head, or that I might turn my head without turning my whole body. It occurred to me that a certain kind of hypervigilance is at work here, and that this hypervigilance is a feature of Asperger’s Syndrome.

For me, the visual and auditory world is a chaotic, ever-changing place. My eyes are always darting around, trying to make sure that the world is still in order. My sensory processing makes the world seem vast and overwhelming. To me, change is a given. I never expect anything to stay in one place. I’m so attuned to small details that I’m keenly aware when something has been moved, when a pattern has been interrupted, or when symmetry turns into asymmetry. It happens constantly. I like to organize things because it gives me a sense of control over a world that feels like it’s changing in strange and unexpected ways.

So when an autistic child is asked “Where will Sally look for the marble?” perhaps that child is so used to the world being chaotic and overwhelming that he or she automatically assumes that Sally would never look in the place she last saw it. To the contrary: she’d automatically look somewhere else. Being given only two choices—a basket and a box—the child picks the box. Given how the child perceives the world, this conclusion is perfectly rational. It doesn’t indicate a poor ToM at all. It simply indicates that the child believes that Sally processes sensory input like he or she does. Just because the odds are against Sally being autistic doesn’t mean that the child’s conclusion is wrong. The child is simply drawing a conclusion based on his or her own experience.

In this, the child who thinks that Sally will look in the box is no different from the researcher who assumes that that Sally will look in the basket. The “correct” answer is based on the researcher’s own sensory experience. To someone without sensory processing difficulties, the world appears a more orderly and manageable place. A neuro-typical person would figure that the marble would be where he or she had left it. It’s not surprising then, that neuro-typical children “pass” this test 100% of the time.

A better test might be to have Anne move the marble to an unknown place and ask the child whether Sally will think the marble has been moved. If the answer is yes, the reasearcher might then ask, “Where would she look?” If asked that question, the child might just say, “She’ll look everywhere she can.”  That’s the answer I would have given as a child, because my experience was that nothing stayed the same for very long.  If I had taken the test, I would have gotten dizzy and disoriented just thinking of all the possibilities for where the marble might end up. I’d probably have ended up crying in frustration.

If a researcher were to give such a test, the result would not imply an impaired ToM, but a different way of processing sensory information. It might imply that autism is a sensory processing condition, and that many of its features derive from sensory sensitivity and overload.

At least, that’s how it seems to me.

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg

According to most scientific literature, an impaired Theory of Mind (ToM) is a core component of autism. In his 2001 paper Theory of mind in normal development and autism, Professor Simon Baron-Cohen explains his view of ToM impairment and its implications for autistic people:

“A theory of mind remains one of the quintessential abilities that makes us human (Whiten, 1993). By theory of mind we mean being able to infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action. In brief, having a theory of mind is to be able to reflect on the contents of one’s own and other’s minds. Difficulty in understanding other minds is a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum conditions. The theory of mind difficulties seem to be universal among such individuals.” (Baron-Cohen, 3)

Every time I read this paragraph, my mind boggles at the dissonance between a) Professor Baron-Cohen’s view of autistic people and b) the profound diversity of experience of people on the spectrum. Let’s parse it one step at a time:

1. Having a normal ToM means the ability to reflect upon another person’s beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, and other mental states.

I don’t remember a time when I didn’t reflect upon the mental states of other people. I have close friendships of many years duration with neuro-typical men and women. I have a wonderful marriage to a neuro-typical man, and I’m raising a well-adjusted neuro-typical daughter. I am fully aware that other people think differently than I do, sometimes painfully so. Therefore, I must have a “normal” ToM.

But I also have an AS diagnosis. Interesting.

2. Autistic people seem to have a universal difficulty with ToM abilities.

Uh oh. I must be really odd. I’m able to reflect upon the minds of others. Apparently, no other autistic person can match this feat. Just call me a lone ranger on the neurological spectrum.

3. Having a normal ToM is one of the core components of being a human being.

Oh, my. If you prick us, do we not bleed? Apparently not.

Now, I will readily admit that I cannot infer a person’s mental state by reading nonverbal cues. And while I can reflect endlessly upon the mental processes of neuro-typical people, I find certain of their characteristics unfathomable. Why do people enjoy socializing? What do they get out of it? Why are most people put off by discussion about serious matters? I haven’t a clue.

But let’s turn the tables for a moment. Let’s look at how unfathomable autistic people seem to the vast majority of neuro-typical folk. For many decades, scientists had no ToM regarding the mental processes of an autistic person. Guess how they found out? An autistic person wrote about it. She put it into words. She had to, because your average human being could not infer the mental state of an autistic person by translating his or her nonverbal cues. As Oliver Sacks wrote:

“In 1986, a quite extraordinary, unprecedented and, in a way, unthinkable book was published, Temple Grandin’s Emergence: Labeled Autistic. Unprecedented because there had never before been an ‘inside narrative’ of autism; unthinkable because it had been medical dogma for forty years or more that there was no ‘inside,’ no inner life, in the autistic. . .extraordinary because of its extreme (and strange) directness and clarity. Temple Grandin’s voice came from a place which had never had a voice. . .and she spoke not only for herself, but for thousands of others…” (quoted on www.templegrandin.com)

Wow. Temple Grandin wrote a book and the scientific community had a collective epiphany: “Eureka! We used to think autistic children were just empty shells! What a revelation!”

Who had the imperfect ToM for all those years? Who needed the nonverbal cues to be verbalized and explained? Who was mind-blind? It wasn’t just us.

So why do we on the autism side of the neurological spectrum get stuck with the label of having an impaired ToM?

And why are people on the neuro-typical side of the spectrum considered to have an unimpaired ToM, despite the fact that, prior to 1986, most folks had no idea that autistic people have an interior life?

The problem, of course, is that the scientific community has dubbed its own (neuro-typical) way of thinking “normal” and the autistic way of thinking “abnormal.” Thus, scientists have insisted upon interpreting an autistic person’s behavior the way they would interpret their own behavior.

For example, most doctors would consider an autistic person who does not speak in words to be “low functioning.” But what if the person were having a conversation without words? What if the person were using his or her sense of smell, taste, touch, sound, and sight to have a two-way interaction with his or her environment, an interaction that signals a vivid awareness of the richness and diversity of the sensory world? What if the person speaks through drawings, or paintings, or music? If an outside observer fails to properly read and interpret the signals that an autistic person provides, who has the impairment—the neuro-typical person or the autistic person?

My answer would be, “Neither.” One can only use the word “impairment” if one accepts the categories of “normal” and “abnormal.”

My hope is that the conversation will evolve past these notions and toward an appreciation of neurodiversity in all its forms.

© 2009 by Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg